One Man's Blessing, Another Woman's Curse? Family Factors and the Gender-Earnings Gap of Doctors * Using data from a new longitudinal survey of doctors from Australia, the authors test whether observed large gender-pay gaps among general practitioners (GPs) are the result of women's larger willingness to interrupt their careers. On average, female GPs earn A$83,000 or 54% less than male GPs. The difference between men and women with children is A$105,000, and A$45,000 for men and women without children. Of this gap, 66-75% is explained by differences in observable characteristics such as hours worked. The family gap emerges also within the sexes. Female GPs with children experience an earnings penalty of A$15,000-A$25,000 in comparison to women without children; almost 100% of this difference is due to observable characteristics such as hours worked and career interruptions. Male GPs with children experience a family premium of A$35,000 in comparison to men without children, indicating the presence of a breadwinner effect that exacerbates the genderearnings gap.
Introduction
Women represent an increasingly large share of medical graduates and the physician workforce. In the US in 2010, 48% of all graduates in medicine were women compared to less than 7% in 1965 (Leadley and Sloane, 2011) . In the UK in 2010, 56% of all admissions into medical school were women. Today, 42% of all registered doctors are women, and they are predicted to make up 55% of the workforce at some point between 2017 and 2022 (Elston, 2009 ). In Australia, over 60% of medical graduates and 35.7% of practicing doctors are women (AIHW, 2011) .
Despite the feminisation of the medical workforce, signicant wage dierentials between men and women are surprisingly common within this highly-skilled occupation.
The gender-wage gap for physicians in the US, even allowing for dierences in training or specialisation, has been estimated to be up to 22% (Kehrer, 1976; Langwell, 1982; Ohsfeldt and Culler, 1986; Shih and Konrad, 2007; Weeks et al., 2009; Sasso et al., 2011; Jagsi et al., 2012) .
1 Wide gaps of 15%, 24%, and 30% have also been reported in Austria (Theurl and Winner, 2011) , Australia (Cheng et al., 2011), and England (Gravelle et al., 2011) , respectively.
As with the general literature on gender-wage gaps, little consensus prevails on what explains these dierences. In occupations with a higher share of women, opportunities for discrimination against women, a common explanation for the gender-wage gap since the seminal work of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) , are less likely. In addition, family doctors are commonly self-employed, which may rule out discrimination by employers against female doctors.
We hypothesise that gender-earning gaps are the result of the division of labour between men and women to manage family responsibilities and its implied dierences in labour supply. The importance of family factors in determining work-hours, job commitment, and continuity of employment has received little attention in the medical labour supply literature. The exception is Sasser (2005) who nds that the presence of children accounts for 39% of the male-female earnings gap and a child is associated with almost Baker (1996) is the only study which nds no dierences in wages between male and female general practitioners. 1 20% lower annual earnings among female GPs in the US.
2 The mechanisms through which family obligations work is that women may invest less in their human capital or employers may oer fewer training opportunities to women in anticipation of the child-rearing responsibilities. Women with children may reduce their eort per hour and/or hours worked by taking on traditional gender roles in the household (Becker, 1985) .
If women with children generally work less hours and are less productive, this will not only lead to an earnings gap between men and women, but also between women with and women without children. Evidence for a family gap among women has been found in the general economics literature (Waldfogel, 1997 (Waldfogel, , 1998 Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Bertrand et al., 2010; Viitanen, 2012) . The rst child is associated with a wage penalty of up to 33% that may persist for 30 years (e.g. Viitanen, 2012 , for the UK).
It has also been demonstrated that the size of the family gap is particularly high for college-educated women who have more human capital to lose than less skilled women (Anderson et al., 2002; Miller, 2011) . A good example of the career impact of children has been demonstrated for female lawyers (e.g. Noonan et al., 2005) and MBA graduates (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2010) . Bertrand et al. (2010) show that after 15 years following the MBA, women with children have an eight-months decit in actual post-MBA experience and work 24% fewer weekly hours than female MBAs without children.
Moreover, it is likely that the presence of children in the household may also aect the work behaviour of men. Having children will increase the family's demand for goods and services, and in the face of a likely reduction in their partner's working hours due to raising children, men with children may work longer hours and provide higher eort per hour compared to men without children (Hundley, 2000; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Glauber, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2010). 3 If family obligations and their subsequent laboursupply eects are the main reason for gender dierences in pay, then the gender-earnings gap should be largest between men and women with children, and negligible between men Sasser (2005) nds no statistically signicant gender-gap for hourly earnings when controlling for human capital and productivity, suggesting that dierences in work-hours fully explain the earnings gap.
! Evidence exists also on the male wage premium of marriage (Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Loh, 1996; Jacobsen and Rayack, 1996) . 2 and women without.
Identifying the reasons for gender-pay gaps for doctors is dicult, because hardly any data are available on the earnings and family background of this specialised occupational group. We can solve this problem by using data from a new, and unique, longitudinal survey of Australian doctors "Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL) which does not only provide detailed background information on the GPs' private and work life, but a large enough sample to study the behaviour of various subgroups. To test whether it is family responsibilities that explain gender-earning gaps, we decompose the dierences in mean earnings in the tradition of Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) across and within the sexes by family status and age cohorts.
The institutional framework of remuneration of GPs in Australia
The institutions governing remuneration of Australian GPs provide an interesting contrast to the US. GPs in Australia are able to charge patients what the market will bear through the fee-for-service system, and so can inuence earnings through changes in both price and volume. The prices charged by US physicians, however, are more likely to be regulated by the fee-schedule of the private or public insurer. GPs in Australia can choose to practise in any location, unless they are from overseas when they are required to practise in areas of workforce shortage.(for an overview see Duckett, 2007) Patients can visit any GP of their choice, which implies that an entrepreneurial GP who seeks to increase his or her patient stock will have to build up a good reputation to attract more patients.
The government provides xed subsidies for four basic types of consultation which increase according to their length and complexity, from Level A to Level D. Subsidies (currently around A$35 for a level B consultation) are provided through the national tax-nanced insurance scheme, Medicare. GPs can either accept the subsidised fee, and therefore`bulk-bill' patients, or they can charge a fee above the Medicare's subsidy. In the former case, no costs are incurred for the patient, as Medicare directly reimburses the GP.
In the latter case, the patient needs to cover out-of-pocket the dierence between the fee charged and the subsidy paid. Currently, around 81.7% of all GP services are bulk-billed, 3 varying between 49% (Australian Capital Territory) and 86% (New South Wales).
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The GP has discretion to bulk-bill any patient. However, to make access to services more equitable, since 2005 GPs have received an additional A$5-A$8.75 (in 2010) from the government if bulk-billing children under 16, concession card holders, or patients in designated metropolitan or rural areas or in Tasmania. The government also provides additional grants and payments to practices through the Practice Incentives Program, which includes incentive payments for managing diabetes and asthma, providing cervical screening, and being located in a rural area.
5 GPs who practise in designated areas of workforce shortage, mainly remote and rural areas, are also eligible for an additional range of grants and incentive payments. The government also periodically provides capital infrastructure grants, and has introduced a grant scheme to fund practice nurses.
Seventy six per cent of GPs are not practice owners. These GPs work for GP principals and other types of practice owner, and can be paid using a range of methods including salary, a xed payment per session, or an agreed percentage of billings (Kron, 2012) .
These GPs have less discretion to control their earnings than practice owners.
Data

Sample denition
We use data on qualied GPs from both wave 1 and 2 (2008, 2009) In 2008, a total of 54,570 doctors (which is the population of all doctors in Australia) across four broad doctor groups were invited to participate. 10,498 doctors form the baseline cohort in the rst wave, which includes 3,906 GPs (with 226 GP registrars), 4,597 specialists, 1,072 specialists-in-training and 924 hospital non-specialists. The cohort was found to be representative of the overall doctor population with respect to age, gender, geographic location and hours worked (Joyce et al., 2010 The sample is restricted to individuals who report working hours between four and 100 hours a week. We trimmed the top and bottom part of the earnings distribution by removing the highest and lowest 1% of income earners. Observations were also excluded if a GP reported working less than half of the year and if the reported number of working hours across dierent questions in the survey was inconsistent with the total number of hours worked. Our estimation sample includes 1,935 male GPs and 1,683 female GPs for whom data are available on all covariates used in the analysis. Out of these 3,618 GPs, 41.4% stem from wave 1, 22.1% from wave 2, and 37.4% are present in both waves.
Variable denitions
We measure remuneration as annual real gross earnings expressed in 2009 A$. We focus on annual earnings as opposed to hourly wages as earnings may not be proportional to the number of hours worked. Bashaw and Heywood (2001) and Gravelle et al. (2011) suggested, and found evidence, that the gender wage gap may be underestimated when looking at hourly wages, because hourly wages decrease with the total hours worked per week. Women generally work less hours per week and thus their hourly wages should be relatively high in comparison to those of men. As can be seen in Figure Explanatory variables are based on those used by Cheng et al. (2011) using the same data source (see Table 1 ).
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[Insert Table 1 here]
Since we use gross annual earnings as the main dependent variable, we also include the logarithm of hours worked as an explanatory variable to allow for the decreasing marginal return of labour supply. This specication introduces the potential of endogeneity, since hours are a function of wages (Gravelle et al., 2011) . We test explicitly for endogeneity and re-estimate our preferred model with a 2SLS approach. The instrumental variable used in the rst stage is the`age of the youngest dependent child'. Alternative instrumental variables such as`having a partner who works part-time' or`having a dependent child under the age of 5' are applied in a robustness check. To be a valid instrument, the presence of a young child must be strongly correlated with hours worked, and must have no independent eect on earnings beyond its eect on labour supply. These assumptions appear to be standard in the literature on female labour supply decisions (see Gravelle et al., 2011, for a discussion).
We measure labour force attachment with weeks of holiday taken in the past year, actual years of experience, actual years of experience squared, and whether the GP took more than one year o since graduation (=1 if yes). Actual work experience is dened as the number of years since graduation from medical school less time spent out of clinical practice.
Though GPs obtain similar training that qualies them for registration, some of them continue their postgraduate education. To capture these dierences in human capital, we include the number of postgraduate qualications, and whether the GP is a fellow of a college.
An alternative explanation for the gender-earnings gap among GPs is that men and women dier in their work-place productivity. These well-documented dierences in practice style have an impact on the quality and quantity of consultations a GP provides per week (Bensing et al., 1993) . Female GPs tend to have longer consultations, and thus treat fewer patients per hour than men (Langwell, 1982; Britt et al., 2005) , take more time per patient to explain medical terminology (Martin et al., 1998) , or are more likely to engage in`patient-centred' communication styles Hall, 2002, 2004) . Patients of doc-tors who were rated to have good interpersonal skills expressed higher satisfaction with their doctors' service and complied better with treatment recommendations, and this may increase demand and earnings for such doctors (Sandhu et al., 2009; Saultz and Lochner, 2005) .
We measure productivity and practice styles by consultation length (minutes spent per patient) and the proportion of patients bulk-billed, respectively. The proportion of patients bulk-billed may capture either the GP's preferences for volume of patients (Doessel, 1990) or for equity. Market demand factors are measured by the fee charged for a standard consultation and the length of wait for an appointment with the doctor (number of days). These market demand factors could potentially proxy patient discrimination against female doctors, although empirical evidence suggests that female doctors experience positive discrimination by female patients are not discriminated against by patients (E.g. Godegar, 2012; Reyes, 2008) .
We further control for the location in which the GP practises to capture access to care.
Location is measured by the Australian Standard Geographic Classication of Rurality that distinguishes four categories: major city, outer regional, inner regional, remote. To control for population needs, we use socio-economic status classications based on the Socio-Economic Index For Areas (SEIFA) measured in the postcode in which the GP practises and the density of GPs in this area.
In addition to standard measures of productivity, we control for GPs' personality traits. Personality is associated with interpersonal skills and one particular trait, conscientiousness, has been shown to be consistently related to job performance across all occupations (e.g. Barrick et al., 2001 , for a meta-analysis). As personality diers substantially by gender (see Stake and Eisele, 2010 , for an overview), dierences may explain parts of the gender-earnings gap. To measure personality traits, we employ the widely used Big-Five factor model which comprises ve dimensions: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience (John and Srivastava, 2001 ).
Each trait is scored from 1 to 7, with a high score indicating that the personality trait describes the individual very well. The ve scales are composed by taking the average 7 over three items per dimensions (see Further, we control for whether the GP is self-employed. Hundley (2000) shows that gender-earnings dierentials are higher for the self-employed than for other occupations because men and women enter self-employment for dierent reasons: men because they seek to make money and women because they want a more exible job to accommodate household duties. Self-employed GPs are likely to have higher earnings since a portion of their earnings reect returns to managerial responsibilities and risks taken. We dene self-employment as being either a principal or an associate of a GP's medical practice.
To allow for the impact of economies of scale and scope, we control both for the number of full-time and part-time doctors in the practice. Finally, we control for the gender-mix of the practice by including a variable that indicates whether the respondent works in a mixed or a single sex practice. If discrimination against women is mainly driven by male employers restricting the earnings and promotion opportunities of female doctors, then it can only occur in mixed-gender practices (Gravelle et al., 2011 We start out by estimating a model of annual gross earnings and decompose the genderearnings gap for the full sample that pools all age-groups. A crucial extension to this baseline analysis is to adjust for the potential endogeneity in hours worked. Further, we will present the decomposition results for the gender-wage gap to be able to gauge the extent to which observable characteristics that matter for the gender-earnings gap are also inuencing the gender-gap in hourly wages. In a second step, we then conduct the earnings decomposition separately for four narrowly dened comparison groups: (1) men and women without children; (2) men and women with children; (3) women with and without children; and (4) men with and without children. For each comparison, we separate the sample into younger (ages < 40) and older (ages 40+) groups which allows us to test whether gender-dierentials in earnings dier by cohorts or over the life cycle. Once the earnings gap is calculated, one can assess the contribution of dierences in observable characteristics (from here onwards referred to as explained contribution) and dierences in the eects of these characteristics (from here onwards referred to as unexplained contribution).
To decompose these dierences, we follow Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) by lettingX 1 − X 2 be the dierences in observable characteristics between group 1 and group 2, and
2 be the dierences in returns to these characteristics. Thus, the contribution to the dierence in average, logarithmatised earnings for group 1 (lnȲ 1 ) and group 2 (lnȲ 2 ) is:
In equation (1), the explained contribution refers to the dierences in observed chardoctors from high earnings practices.
acteristics, whereas the unexplained contribution refers to dierences in returns to these characteristics and dierences in the constant. The unexplained contribution is sometimes referred to in the literature as`discrimination', as it contains all factors that are not productivity-related. This argument assumes that all productivity-related factors are observable, which often is not the case. It is more likely that the unexplained part captures unobserved heterogeneity (see Fortin et al., 2011 , for a discussion).
One crucial question is which values to choose forβ * , which represents the counterfactual group. Possible candidates are the coecient vector of group 1 (Ω = 1), of group
The latter denotes the proportion of the squared variation of group 1 characteristics in the total variation of observable characteristics across both groups. In more simple terms, this means that one can estimate all coecients of interest from a regression that pools both groups, under the assumption that there is no discrimination against any group in the sample (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994) .
In our analysis, we employ the coecients obtained from a pooled regression forβ * , which assumes that there is no discrimination in the labour market of doctors. The same counter-factual has been applied in e.g. Gittleman and Wol (2004) , Albrecht et al. (2003), and Boden and Galizzi (2003) . Using the coecients of the group with higher earnings would require to make the assumption that the lower earnings group is negatively discriminated against. Using the coecients of the lower earnings group would require the assumption that the higher paid group is positively favoured in the labour market.
Neither of the latter two assumptions appear to be compelling in our context. Since we compare, among others, men (or women) with and without children, we cannot a priori assume that one group or the other is discriminated against on the basis of having a child.
8 To avoid potential biases in the estimated coecients of β * , that could lead to an over-statement of the explained dierences in earnings, we include a group dummy in the pooled regression (see Elder et al., 2010) . Further, to make the decomposition results invariant to the choice of the omitted base category of the dummy variable indicators, we & It should be noted that using the lower-income-group coecients usually makes the explained part of the decomposition smaller (e.g. Bertrand and Hallock, 2001) . This is also true in our empirical setting.
apply the deviation contrast transform (Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2004; Yun, 2005a,b) .
Since we pool two waves of data in the analysis, we apply clustered standard errors in all estimation models.
5 Descriptive results on the gender wage gap
Summary statistics by family status
The overall gender-earnings gap in the raw data is A$92,642, but this average varies substantially depending on the life cycle or family status of the group comparison. For instance, the earnings gap is only A$44,443 between younger men and women or A$55,627
between older men and women GPs who have no children. In stark contrast, the genderearnings gap is much larger for both younger and older GPs who have children. For instance, among younger GPs the gap is as large as A$104,244, and A$109,705 among older GPs (See Table 2 ). The`family gap' (see Table 3 ) in earnings is also evident for women (or men) with children. The average family penalty for both younger and older women is about A$18,000. For men, however, there appears to be an earnings premium for family. Both younger and older men with children earn about A$40,000 more than their colleagues without children.
The life cycle prole for earnings by family status for each sex group is depicted in Figure 1 , which allows for non-linearities in the age eect (kernel regression plot). Women with children have substantially lower earnings up until age 45 (largest dierence). At the age of 35, the earnings penalty of children is about 14.8% (A$115,000 versus A$135,000).
At age 45 it is equivalent to a gap of 25.7% (A$130,000 versus A$175,000). From thereafter the earnings proles converge.
9 For men, the income dierences by family status are larger at younger ages. At age 35, the family premium peaks at 27.3% (A$220,000 versus A$160,000). [Insert Table 2 here] Table 3 reports the relevant characteristics for women (or men) with versus without children. It is straightforward to understand why women with children in younger ages earn less than women without children: they work almost 3.5 weeks less per year and 10 hours less per week than women without children; they have about one-third fewer post-graduate qualications; they see almost 15 patients less per week in their private consulting rooms; they take about 3 more weeks of leave or holiday per year, and they have had longer career interruptions (6 months since graduation). For these comparisons the dierences in means are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
However, there are no obvious dierences in productivity, practice styles or market factor constraints. At later stages of the life cycle many of the dierences in labour supply disappear, while dierences in earnings persist. The dierence in work-hours has fallen from 10 hours to 4.5 hours per week relative to older female GPs who never had any children. Surprisingly, both groups have interrupted their careers on average by about 2 years since graduation, suggesting that women interrupt their careers also for reasons unrelated to child-rearing responsibilities.
[Insert Table 3 here] 13 For younger men, there seem to be fewer dierences in characteristics that could help explain the family-earnings gap. Even though younger male GPs without children earn signicantly less than men with children, as seen in Figure 1 (a), they do not dier in their labour supply and practice styles. The only notable dierences are that men with children are more likely to be self-employed by about 14 percentage points (p-value 0.04).
It appears that the breadwinner eect manifests itself through GPs not working harder, but gaining higher returns from their work through self-employment. For older male GPs, more notable dierences in labour supply and practice style are observed. For instance,
GPs without children work six hours less and see almost 15 fewer patients per week, charge about A$2.80 less per standard consultation, bulk-bill 6.5 percentage points more of their patients (p-value 0.02), and are less likely to be self-employed by about 6 percentage points (p-value 0.06).
6 Estimation results
Determinants of earnings
So far, we have shown in our descriptive analysis that the gender-earnings gap depends on family status and the life cycle, and that a family premium exists for men, and a family penalty for women. We have also shown that women tend to work less hours and interrupt their careers more often than men, independent of whether they have children or not. In the following sections, we show that these general conclusions hold even when controlling for a wide variety of factors.
We start out with estimating and discussing the results from an earnings model in which we pool all age and household composition groups. The dependent variable is the logarithm of gross annual earnings and the model includes all covariates described in the data section. Full estimation results are presented in column (1) of Tables A.2 and A.3 for women and men, respectively. Overall, the models explain 32% of the variation in earnings for men and 53% of the variation in earnings for women. Note that the larger explained variation in earnings for women may stem from the fact that this group of women is a highly self-selected and potentially homogeneous group (high IQ, high level of education, professional with a large degree of altruism).
6.2 Gender-earnings gap for pooled sample
How large is the gender-earnings gap, and which factors explain the gap for this pooled sample? Table 4 reports the decomposition results using the Oaxaca-Ransom method as outlined in equations (1) and (2). In this pooled model, the log dierence in earnings is 0.542 or 71.9%, which is A$83,517. About two-thirds of this dierence is due to dierences in observable characteristics (explained contribution), whereas one-third is due to dierences in the rewards of these characteristics (unexplained contribution).
The majority of the observed dierences in earnings between men and women are due to dierences in hours worked which make up 53% of the total raw dierence in earnings.
If women worked the same number of hours as men, their earnings would be 0.292 log points, or 34%, larger (z-stat=18.7). The second largest contributing factor to explaining the gender-earnings gap is whether the individual is self-employed in the magnitude of about 8% of the total dierence. If women were similarly entrepreneurial as men, they would earn 0.044 log points, or 4.5%, more (z-stat=7.6). Practice size also matters, as do population needs to a lesser extent. All other dierences in observed characteristics make up less than 0.01 of the log dierence in earnings and most of them are not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
Also reported in Table 4 are the decomposition results of hourly wages between male and female GPs. The overall dierence in hourly wages is much smaller, with a log points dierence of 0.162, or 17.6%. Less than 30% of this dierence is explained by dierences in observable characteristics. The major dierence in hourly wages between men and women is due to dierences in self-employment (about 20%). Men also tend to work in larger practices, and this dierence makes up 7.6% of the overall wage gap. Population needs also contribute to the gap (5.7%), as does labour force attachment (2.2%). All other observable factors explain less than 2% of the gender-wage gap.
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[Insert Table 4 here] 6.3 Are work-hours endogenous?
The decomposition results presented so far are based on the assumption that hours of work are exogenous. However, earnings and hours of work are likely to be jointly determined.
One explanation for this joint determination is that hours of work are a function of potential earnings that proxy an individual's productivity and/or willingness to engage in the labour market. Another explanation is that, given self-employment and exibility of hours in general practice, GPs decide on how many hours to work and what prices to charge at the same time. Another explanation could be the omission of other factors such as ability that determine both earnings and hours worked.
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Potential endogeneity is addressed by re-estimating the preferred model with a 2SLS approach, in which hours of work are instrumented with`age of the youngest child'.
12 The instrumental variable is a strong predictor of hours worked for both men and women (Ftest statistics are 76.3 for women and 36 for men). Our conclusions about the determinants of the gender-earnings gap do not change in the 2SLS model (see Table 4 ). Similar to the OLS model, two-thirds of the dierence in earnings is explained by dierences in observable characteristics. Dierences in hours worked between men and women still explain almost 50% of the gender-earnings gap. Dierences in self-employment, practice size, and labour force attachment constitute the remaining most important factors that sum to explain about 14.5% of the dierences in earnings.
It needs to be further stressed that endogeneity in hours worked may not be a statistical problem either. A Hausman-Wu test statistic for a test of exogeneity of hours worked is not rejected for men (p-value 0.098) and women (p-value 0.048) at the 1% level. These
The omission of ability as a third confounder may be less compelling given our homogeneous sample of equally trained doctors and having controlled for personality traits as an omnibus measure for ability and preferences (see Almlund et al., 2011) .
We also included a dummy variable for whether the information on the youngest child is missing from the data. There are 1,169 observations for whom the information on age of the youngest child is missing.
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results are almost identical when using alternative single and multiple instruments. We hypothesised that if family factors fully explained the gender-earnings gap, then there should be no dierence in earnings between men and women without children. Table 5 reports the estimation results that test this hypothesis, but we nd little evidence in favour of it. First, younger women without children earn 0.317 log points, or 37%, less than younger men without children, which is equivalent to A$45,285. Even though almost three-quarters of the earnings dierence is due to dierences in observable characteristics, one-quarter still remains unexplained. Dierences in hours worked explain 44% of the gender-earnings gap. If women without children worked the same number of hours as men without children, they would earn 15% (0.138 log points) more. Dierences in labour force attachment (e.g. holiday or leave taken) make up another 8% of the total ! Almost identical decomposition results are obtained when using alternative instrumental variables such as a combination of the age of the youngest child and the partner works part-time, or having a child under the age of 5. The F-test statistic for having a child under the age of 5 is 82 for women and 26 for men. The p-value of a Hausman-Wu test statistic of the hypothesis that hours worked is not endogenous in this IV setting is 0.12 and 0.41 for men and 0.11 and 0.02 for women. The F-test statistic for combination of the age of the youngest child and the partner works part-time is 66 for women and 24 for men. The p-value for the Sargan test for an over-identied system is 0.10 for women and 0.03 for men when using the two instrumental variables. Since we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments may be somehow correlated with the error term in the earnings equation for men, we prefer to use only one instrument. We do so following Bound et al. (1995) [Insert Table 5 here]
Model I in
Though the absolute size of the earnings gap is similar for GPs above age 40 (the bottom panel for Model I), only 50% of the gap is accounted for by observable characteristics. Dierences in working hours explain only 37% of the gap, while dierences in entrepreneurship explain now a larger proportion (7.2% of the gap) compared to the younger age group. Practice size contributes 7.2% to the dierence in earnings. Dierences in labour force attachment appear to contribute little to the gender-earnings gap for the older age group.
Large dierences in earnings are observed when comparing men and women with children (Model II), which are the most common groups in our sample. The genderearnings gap is 108% (0.73 log points) for the younger age-group, which translates into a dierence in gross annual earnings of A$105,091. For this group-comparison, four-fths of the gap is explained by dierences in observable characteristics, mainly due to dierences in hours worked (71% of the total dierence). If women with children worked the same number of hours as men with children, then they would earn 68.3% (0.521 log points) more than they currently do. Dierences in entrepreneurship contribute 2.7%, while dierences in personality traits contribute 4.6% to the gap. If women had the same personality traits as men they would earn 3.5% (0.034 log points) more. This is an interesting result because in the pooled sample we could not identify such an eect of personality, and it was also not found in Cobb-Clark and Tan (2011), who estimated the determinants of the gender-wage gap across all occupations for a nationally-representative Australian sample.
The size of the gender-earnings gap for older age groups remains close to that of the younger age group (0.65 log points or 92%), but a slightly smaller portion of this dierence, 69% versus 79%, are explained by observable characteristics. Hours worked contribute less, but still 54% to the overall gap, while entrepreneurship contribute more to the earnings dierences by 8.2% compared to the the younger age group. Similar to the comparison between men and women without children, the contribution of dierences in entrepreneurship to the overall gap is larger for the older age group (8%). If women were equally entrepreneurial as men, they would earn 5.6% (0.054 log points) more. One explanation for this phenomenon is that doctors at younger ages are less likely to be self-employed, possibly due to credit constraints to nance a practice. Ambitious doctors accumulate more income at younger ages by working longer hours and treating more patients. Having accumulated savings, GPs at older ages are more likely to aord a practice of their own. Last, male GPs with or without children also tend to work in larger practices, which bring in larger prots, than women. Such dierences make up another 3.5-7.3% of the overall gap.
Family-earnings gap
So far, we were able to show that the gender-earnings gap is strongly determined by dierences in working hours for all age-groups, especially so for GPs with children. In the following we establish evidence for a family-earnings gap within sex-groups by comparing female doctors with children to female doctors without children (Model III, Table 6 ) and male doctors with children to male doctors without children (Model IV, Table 6 ).
Younger women without children earn 25% (0.226 log points), or A$24,543, more than women with children, and four-fths of this dierence can be explained by dierences in observable characteristics.
14 The major contributor to the earnings gap is dierences in " Note, 129% of the earnings gap are due to observable characteristics, whereas -29% are due to unobservable characteristics, adding up to 100%. The negative percentage gure states that if women with children had the same returns as women without children, they would earn 29% less. In absolute work hours. If women without children worked the same number of hours as women with children, they would earn 39% (0.33 log points) more. In contrast, if women with children had the same qualications as women without children, they would earn 4.8% less.
[Insert Table 6 here] Surprisingly, family-earnings dierences do not widen over the life cycle for women with children compared to women without children. The gap between women with and without children narrows from 25% to 12.6%. Moreover, this gap is explained almost entirely by dierences in observable characteristics (97%), especially so by hours worked (92%). According to Sasser (2005) , the earnings gap needs some time to materialise over the years. If women interrupt their careers at earlier stages, they will feel the earnings penalty later on, as they accumulate less work experience. Yet, we cannot nd evidence for this argument in our data. However, we must concede that we are comparing cohorts, and do not observe the same individuals ageing over time. To be able to interpret our older age analysis as life-cycle dierences we need to assume that the two cohorts are no dierent in relevant observable and unobservable characteristics. It may well be that older female GPs resemble pioneers with extreme levels of motivation and persistence, because for them it may have been more dicult to enter medical schools due to prevailing traditional gender-role attitudes.
Last, Model IV of Table 6 displays the decomposition of the earnings dierences between men with and without children. We nd evidence in favour of a breadwinner eect of children. For instance, younger male GPs without children earn 21.4% (0.194 log points) less than GPs with children, which amounts to A$35,691. Less than 20% of this earnings gap can be explained by dierences in observable characteristics. Dierences in self-employment, qualications, market conditions, and labour force attachment contribute to the family-earnings gap, but they contribute little to the overall gap in magnitude or statistical signicance (except for the contribution of market conditions).
numbers, the total of 129% + 29% is 158% and thus 129% makes up four-fth of this total.
A dierent pattern evolves for older male GPs, although the earnings penalty for no children is similar with 26%. For the older cohort, almost four-fths of the earnings gap is explained by dierences in observable characteristics, and 61% of the gap is explained by dierences in work hours alone. If male GPs without children worked the same amount of hours as male GPs with children, they would earn 15.3% more. If they also interrupted less often their careers, they would earn 1.2% more. Male GPs with children appear to be more entrepreneurial and are located in areas with higher demand for their services.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the relationship between family factors and the widely observed gap in earnings between female and male GPs using a novel longitudinal survey that has been conducted in Australia since 2008. Our results conrm the importance of having children in explaining the gender-earnings gap. Family factors reect largely the reduced hours worked by women with children, relative to women without children or to men with or without children.
Our evidence on the existence of a substantial family-earnings gap for Australian doctors is in line with the general evidence of a wage penalty for children (see Waldfogel, 1998 , for an overview). Such wage penalties have also been found for highly skilled MBA graduates in the US (Bertrand et al., 2010) and lawyers (Noonan et al., 2005) .
A novel nding of our study is that, even though family status is strongly linked with reduced hours of work and longer career interruptions, women without children still earn less than men without children. Our results contradict Sasser (2005) who nds that male and female doctors without children earn similar wages. In our data, female GPs without children tend to interrupt their careers and work fewer hours equally as often. The exact nature of these career breaks cannot be identied, but they may reect a stronger preference for leisure activities such as time spent travelling or volunteering.
Further, we nd ample evidence of a male breadwinner eect. Male GPs with children earn more than male GPs without children independent of the life cycle/cohort. The breadwinner eect states that men increase their labour supply and productivity as a 21 form of behavioural change to provide for their children. Alternatively, the breadwinner eect may be the result of selection into having families. Men who go on to have children later on in life are generally more productive than those who never have children, and that this productivity makes male doctors also more likely to have children. Our data does not allow us to separate out these two hypotheses, however, Petersen et al. (2011) does not nd evidence that selection into having children is a factor in explaining earnings dierences. If the family premium for male GPs is truly a breadwinner eect, then this behavioural change exacerbates the gender-earnings dierential.
Last, the gender-and family-earnings gaps, if anything, narrow for those over 40 years of age. Whether or not these declining dierentials are a life cycle or cohort eect cannot be judged from our data. It may well be that women who became GPs two to three decades ago were dierent to women who become GPs today. Though we show that the earning gaps narrow between our various group comparisons at dierent ages, this would need to be conrmed by longitudinal analysis of the same women over time, which will be possible once more waves of the MABEL data become available.
If the gender-pay gap is a result of the choice to start a family and take a career break, then the gap is likely to persist on aggregate and change over time slowly in line with changes in fertility. If this is the case, then medical workforce policy should be designed to manage the cost and productivity implications of these demographic changes in the working population rather than designing pay legislation or equal opportunity frameworks to reduce discrimination. This is particularly the case in medicine, where an ever increasing proportion of physicians are women. In professions with a large or increasing share of women, public policy would have to acknowledge the economic benets of reducing the costs of career interruptions, such as more exible training and working hours (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2010). Sample weights are applied to construct group means. Sample weights are applied to construct group means. 935 -0.355 -0.504 -65.541 -0.306 -0.873 -188.292 N 1935 1683 1935 1683 1935 1683 Pooled samples. IVs used age of youngest child and dummy if age of youngest child missing. The F-test statistic of the rst stage regression that tests for the statistical insignicance of the two instruments is 76.3 for women and 36 for men. The p-value for a Hausman-Wu test statistic of no endogeneity in hours worked is 0.05 for women and 0.10 for men. The z-statistic refers to the the hypothesis that the contribution to the gender-earnings dierential is statistically signicant. The z-statistic refers to the the hypothesis that the contribution to the gender-earnings dierential is statistically signicant. All models apart from (2) are estimated with OLS, clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The instrumental variable used in the 2SLS model is the age of the youngest dependent child (and an indicator for whether this information is missing). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models apart from (2) are estimated with OLS, clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The instrumental variable used in the 2SLS model is the age of the youngest dependent child (and an indicator for whether this information is missing). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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